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Abstract
The standard treatment of conditional probability leaves conditional probability un-
defined when the conditioning proposition has zero probability. Nonetheless, some find
the option of extending the scope of conditional probability to include zero-probability
conditions attractive or even compelling. This articles reviews some of the pitfalls asso-
ciated with this move, and concludes that, for the most part, probabilities conditional
on zero-probability propositions are more trouble than they are worth.
∗But if you try, sometimes, you find you get what you need.
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1 Introduction
Let A be a set of propositions, closed under Boolean operations, let Pr be a probability
function on A, and, for some proposition C, let PrC be another probability function
on A, to be thought of as yielding probabilities conditional on C.1 It is uncontroversial
that, if C is in A, these should satisfy
Pr(AC) = PrC(A) Pr(C). (1)
If Pr(C) > 0, then the unconditional probability function Pr, together with the re-
quirement that (1) hold, uniquely determines PrC(A), for any A ∈ A:
PrC(A) =
Pr(AC)
Pr(C)
. (2)
If, however, Pr(C) = 0, then Pr(AC) is also equal to zero, and (1) is satisfied for any
value whatsoever of PrC(A), and so (1) leaves PrC(A) completely undetermined.
One reaction, the standard one, is to leave PrC(A) undefined except for C ∈ A with
Pr(C) > 0. But, since (1) places no constraints whatsoever on the function PrC when
Pr(C) = 0, for such propositions we are free, without fear of violating this condition,
to define PrC to be any probability function whatsoever on A. Instead of relying on
(1) to define conditional probability functions in terms of the unconditional probability
function Pr, we can take conditional probability as primitive. This is a route that has
been recommended by a number of authors over the years. In support of this, cases
are sometimes adduced that suggest that there are probabilities conditional on zero-
probability propositions that have clearly defined values (see §2, below). Moreover, it
seems we have to regard some probabilities conditional on zero-probability propositions
as well-defined, in order to do justice to statistical practice, since statistical practice
invokes likelihood functions, which ascribe probabilities to data as a function of some
continuously varying parameter, and these are well-defined for all parameter values
even if every point value of the parameter is ascribed zero probability. We do not want
to eschew the use of such functions; does this not commit us to probabilities conditional
on zero-probability propositions?
In this essay, I hope to convince the reader that things are not so straightforward.
The examples that purport to show that there are clear-cut answers to requests for
probabilities conditional on propositions of probability zero are misleading. We can
give such questions answers by requiring that the conditional probability functions
possess certain symmetry properties, but this is our choice, not dictated by the nature
of the problem, and we should not let the intuitive appeal of such symmetry properties
blind us to the fact that we must stipulate that the conditional probabilities have
them, in order for the questions to acquire determinate answers. Moreover, there will
be cases in which symmetry conditions that we may wish to impose will clash with each
1We will also use the notation Pr(A|C), when convenient.
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other, or may clash with the desideratum of countable additivity, illustrating Jagger’s
Theorem: You Can’t Always Get What You Want.2
Furthermore, the consequences of taking the standard route, and leaving undefined
probabilities conditional on null propositions (that is, propositions of unconditional
probability zero), are not as dire as some would make them out to be. Though there
are cases (such as the likelihood functions already mentioned) in which quantities
appear that can unproblematically be taken to be probabilities conditional on null
propositions, they need not be, and the theory goes along straightforwardly if we take
all conditional probabilities to have conditions with positive probability.
Some will be undaunted, and will insist on introducing a host of null-condition
conditional probabilities. This can be done, but, if it is done, it should be done and
not merely gestured at: those who invoke probabilities conditional on null propositions
should specify which pairs of propositions A, B they take the conditional probability
Pr(A|B) to be defined for, and specify the values of these conditional probabilities.
2 Examples
Consider the following examples.
Example 1.3 A number is chosen, with uniform probability, from the interval [0, 1].
Conditional on the supposition that the chosen number is either 1/4 or 3/4, what is
the probability that it is 1/4?
Example 2. (Borel-Kolmogorov).4 A point is chosen, with uniform probability, on
the surface of the earth, which we treat as a perfect sphere.
a). What is the probability that the chosen point is in the Western Hemisphere, given
that that it lies on the equator?
b). Conditional on the chosen point lying on the great circle containing the Greenwich
meridian, what is the probability that it lies closer to the equator than to a pole?
2The fact that, in probability theory, we can’t always get what we want, is a familiar fact. It is well-
known that there are no probability functions satisfying certain symmetry conditions, countable additivity,
and the desideratum of having the probability function defined on arbitrary subsets of our sample space.
Consider, for example, the task of defining a uniform distribution—that is, a distribution invariant under all
rotations—on the unit circle. There can be no distribution that is invariant under rotations, is countably
additive, and is defined on all subsets of the unit circle. The proof is found in many probability texts, e.g.
Billingsley (2012, p. 47). The standard response is to preserve countable additivity and to restrict the
domain of definition of the probability function to the measurable sets. If, however, one is willing to give up
countable additivity, it is possible to extend the probability function to one defined on arbitrary subsets; as
Banach (1923) showed, in one and two dimensions it is possible to extend the Lebesgue measure to a finitely
additive measure defined on all subsets that is invariant under transformations that preserve distances. The
well-known Banach-Tarski paradox shows that this is impossible in three-dimensional space.
3Adapted from Ha´jek (2003).
4Based on Kolmogorov (1950, §V.2). See also Jaynes (2003, §15.7), Ha´jek (2003, §4.4).
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Example 3. A number is chosen, with uniform probability, from the interval [0, 1].
Conditional on the supposition that the chosen number is rational, what is the proba-
bility that it is greater than 1/2?
For many, perhaps most, readers, each of the above questions will have an obvious
answer. This should give us pause. In each case, an unconditional probability distri-
bution is given, and a question asked about probabilities conditional on a proposition
with probability zero. As already emphasized, the unconditional probability distribu-
tion, though it does not prohibit such questions from having answers, as it will not
clash with any answers that we give, by the same token cannot determine what those
answers must be. Any intuition that these questions have determinate answers must
involve some tacit assumption not contained in the set-up of the problem. We should
endeavour to make these tacit assumptions explicit, and explore the consequences of
requiring our conditional probabilities to satisfy them.
3 Symmetry Conditions
3.1 Example 1.
Example 1 seems beguilingly simple. It may seem that the symmetry of the problem
dictates the answer 1/2, on pain of irrationality. Nothing at all in the set-up of the
problem favours either 1/4 or 3/4.
But consider this variant on the question. Suppose that the number is chosen from
the unit interval, not with uniform distribution, but according to a distribution given
by the density function
f(x) = 2x. (3)
Now ask the question: conditional on the number chosen being either 1/4 or 3/4, what
is the probability that it is 1/4?
Here, I suspect, intuitions will vary. To some, the answer might still be, obviously,
1/2. To others, reflecting on the fact that the number chosen is more likely to be
greater than 1/2 than less than 1/2, will regard 3/4 as the more probable value. This
intuition can be given a numerical value by considering, that, for any sufficiently small
positive ,
Pr(X ∈ [34 − , 34 + ])
Pr(X ∈ [14 − , 14 + ])
= 3, (4)
which suggests that the number 3/4 is 3 times as probable as 1/4.
Suppose, now, that we change the question only slightly, and ask, if the number is
chosen from the unit interval according to a distribution with density (3), what is the
probability, conditional on the number chosen being either 1/2 or
√
3/2, that it is 1/2?
Similar considerations suggest that
√
3/2 is more probable than 1/2.
If we give this answer, we have thereby achieved incoherence, because this last
question is just our first question rephrased. X being uniformly distributed on the unit
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interval is the same as
√
X being distributed with density (3), and so, choosing X with
uniform distribution, and asking whether 3/4 is more probable than 1/4, conditional
on the chosen number being one of the two, is the same as choosing
√
X according to
(3) and asking whether
√
3/2 is more probable than 1/2.
We can escape incoherence by adopting the convention that, if a number is chosen
according to any probability distribution on the unit interval, then, for any finite subset
of the unit interval, the probability conditional on the number being in that subset is
the same for every member of the set. And, if we are to have equiprobability when
the distribution is uniform, this is the only way to escape incoherence, since, for any
probability distribution that is yielded by a density function, there will always be some
random variable that is uniformly distributed. But this convention may seem odd
to some: consider a density function that is very sharply peaked around 1/2. On the
convention under consideration, conditional on the supposition that the chosen number
is either 1/2 or 9/10 (which could be as many standard deviations away from the peak
as we like), 1/2 and 9/10 are equally probable.
These considerations will, I hope, lead any readers who initially regarded question
1 as having an obvious answer to conclude: things aren’t as straightforward as they
seemed.
3.2 The Sphere
Consider, again, example 1. A point is chosen, with uniform probability, on the surface
of a sphere, and we are asked to reflect on the questions: a) What is the probability
that the chosen point is in the Western Hemisphere, given that that it lies on the
equator? b) Conditional on the chosen point lying on the great circle containing the
Greenwich meridian, what is the probability that it lies closer to the equator than to
a pole?
For question 1(a), the seemingly obvious answer is 1/2. For 1(b), the obvious answer
might seem to be 1/2, again, as half of the length of any meridian consists of points
that are closer to the equator than to a pole.
But consider this: it is not true that 1/2 of the earth’s surface is closer to the
equator than it is to a pole; more of it is closer to the equator. The probability that
a point chosen with uniform probability is closer to the equator than to a pole is
1/
√
2 ≈ 0.707. Since every point lies on some meridian, we might want to say that the
probability, conditional on our point lying on the Greenwich (or any other) meridian,
of being closer to the equator than to a pole, is 1/
√
2.
Any reader who is wondering whether the correct answer to 1(b) is 1/2 or 1/
√
2
or some other number is reminded: the setup of the problem does not determine
any answer. The answer of 1/2 seems to rely on some intuition that the conditional
probabilities should share relevant symmetries with the unconditional distribution. An
intuition is a dangerous thing; we would do well to replace the intuition with an explicit
requirement regarding symmetries.
If a probability space 〈S,A, P r〉 is invariant under a transformation T, then ipso
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facto so is the standard conditional probability space5 〈S,A,A∗, P ∗〉. We may want
to use symmetry considerations to extend the standard conditional probability space
to one that includes conditionalization on null propositions. As a first pass, we might
be tempted to require that our conditional probability space be invariant under all
transformations that leave the unconditional probability space that we started with
invariant; this, we might speculate, is the requirement needed to underwrite the “ob-
vious” answer to question 1(a). A moment’s reflection, however, reveals that this is
unreasonably strong. Let C be any probability-zero subset of S, and, for any transfor-
mation TC of C, consider a transformation of 〈S,A〉 that consists of performing TC on
C and doing nothing elsewhere. Since Pr(C) = 0, this transformation does not change
the unconditional probability of any set. Thus, to require invariance under arbitrary
transformations that leave the unconditional probability space invariant entails that
probabilities conditional on a null set C be invariant under arbitrary transformations
of C, a requirement that is satisfiable when C is a finite set but not otherwise.
The set S of events might have additional structure that we can require our trans-
formations to preserve. In the sphere case, the elementary events are choices of points
on a sphere, and these points have distances between them. We can restrict our atten-
tion to transformations of our probability space that preserve these distances. These
are just the rigid rotations of the sphere. Requiring invariance under all rigid rotations
entails that the conditional probability function, conditional on the chosen point lying
on a circle, be invariant under the subgroup of rotations that leave the circle invariant.
This is is uniquely satisfied by a uniform distribution on the circle.
If the intuition that the obvious answer to the sphere questions 1(a) and 1(b) is 1/2
rests on an implicit assumption that probabilities, conditional on the point lying on a
circle, should be invariant under rotations that leave the circle invariant, then, rather
than leave this implicit, we should place it as an explicit condition on our conditional
probability space. Can we do this? If we’re not too demanding about the extent of
the set B on which we conditionalize, then it is easy to show that we can. This is
done in Appendix 3, where we construct a conditional probability space that includes
conditionalization on all circles and subsets of circles of nonzero length, and is invariant
under rigid rotations of the sphere.
We might want more than this in our domain of conditionalization. Can our condi-
tional probability space be extended in such a way that it includes conditionalization
on all measurable subsets of the sphere, and preserves symmetry under rotations?
If we demand countable additivity, then the answer is easy: no, we can’t. Given
a coordinatization of the sphere by latitude and longitude, consider EQ, the set of
points on the equator whose longitudes are rational numbers. This set is invariant
under rational rotations of the sphere about its axis. Invariance under such rotations
requires that the probability, conditional on EQ, ascribed to any interval of the equator
be proportional to the length of the interval, and this in turn requires the probability
assigned to single points on the equator to be zero. But PEQ(EQ) must be equal to
one, and so the conditional probability function PEQ cannot be countably additive.
5See Appendix 1 for definitions.
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Similar considerations apply, of course, to our Example 3. Our unconditional prob-
ability function is invariant under translations of the unit interval (modulo 1). The
set of rationals in the unit interval is invariant under the subgroup consisting of trans-
lations through a rational distance. Imposing translation symmetry on probabilities
conditional on the number chosen being rational gives the expected answer: conditional
on the number being rational, the probability that it lies in any interval is equal to the
length of that interval. But this comes at the cost of violating countable additivity.
If we conditionalize on the rationals we are faced with a choice between a symmetry
condition that may be desired, and preserving countable additivity. This is something
that we do not have to face when conditioning on sets of nonzero probability; if Pr is
countably additive, and Pr(C) > 0, then PrC is also countably additive.
Suppose we’re willing to give up countable additivity. Is there a conditional prob-
ability space that permits conditionalization on arbitrary measurable subsets of the
sphere, and is invariant under rotations? Since this will include conditionalization on
measure-zero subsets of S that are neither invariant under rotations nor contained in
nontrivial subsets that are invariant under rotations, it is likely that, if such conditional
probability spaces do exist, rotational symmetry will not suffice for uniqueness. We
should expect that, if there are any, there are many such spaces, and that it would
not be a trivial task to specify one. It is, as far as I know, an open question whether
such conditional probability spaces exist. Philosophers who write as if one can blithely
assume that such conditional probability spaces exist are kindly requested to show that
they do, and, if there is more than one, to specify which one they have in mind.
3.3 The Eternal Coin
In the case of the sphere, things worked out (reasonably) well. We were able to identify
a natural group of symmetries, and imposition of these symmetries entailed one of the
‘obvious’ answers to our questions. In other cases, we will not be so lucky. Symmetries
that we may wish to impose can come into conflict.
An interesting example of this is provided by Cian Dorr (2010), in the set-up that
he calls “The Eternal Coin.” The Eternal Coin is a fair coin that is flipped every day,
throughout an infinite past, and will continue to be flipped every day into an infinite
future. In the absence of any other information about the coin, we are invited to con-
sider credences in propositions such as
H: The Coin lands Heads today.
P : The Coin landed Heads on every day in the past.
F : The Coin will land Heads on every day in the future.
All probabilities—including probabilities conditional on propositions with probability
zero—will be taken to be predicated on the setup being as we have described it.6
6This is necessary because, if one has nonzero credence that the coin is not fair, or that the tosses are
not independent, then conditionalization on either F or P will send credence that the setup is as described
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We construct a probability space as follows. Our set Υ of elementary events is the
set of bi-infinite sequences of Heads and Tails. To form a σ-algebra F of measurable
sets, we proceed as follows. For any finite set of integers K, and any u ∈ Υ, we form a
cylinder set CK(u) consisting of all elements of Υ that agree with u on the set K. That
is, a cylinder set is the set of all events that agree on some finite subset of integers. We
take C to be the smallest σ-algebra containing all cylinder sets.
To define a probability measure Pr on 〈Υ, C〉, it suffices to specify the probabilities
of cylinder sets. To do this, we assign, for any k-element set K, the probability 2−k
to each cylinder set CK(u). This function has a unique countably additive extension
to C, which we will take to be our probability measure Pr. This gives us a probability
space 〈Υ, C, P r〉.
This probability measure has, as expected, the following features:
a). Each individual flip has equal probability 1/2 for H and T .
b). Outcomes of distinct flips are independent: if K, L are disjoint sets, then, for all
u, v ∈ Υ,
Pr(CK(u) ∩ CL(v)) = Pr(CK(u)) · Pr(CL(v)).
For any set of integers L, let FL : Υ→ Υ be the ‘bit flip’ transformation on L, that
is, the transformation that consists of exchanging H and T at each place in L. Our
probability space is invariant under all such transformations.
Our probability space is also invariant under permutations of the integers. For any
bijection pi : Z→ Z, let Tpi : Υ→ Υ be the operation whose action on a bi-sequence u
permutes the values of u,
(Tpiu)k = upi(k). (5)
Permutations that will be of particular interest are the shift operations. For any integer
n, let Sn : Υ→ Υ be the operation of shifting everything n places:
(Snu)k = uk−n. (6)
Invariance under shift operations means that, although our coordinatization has a
distinguished origin (the day 0, which we are calling “today”), our probability space is
invariant under shift of this origin.
If Pn is the proposition that the coin landed Heads on the past n days, then
Pr(Pn) = 2
−n. Since P entails Pn for each n, it follows that Pr(P ) = 0. Similarly,
Pr(F ) = 0.
The function Pr, of course, uniquely determines probabilities conditional on propo-
sitions with non-zero probability. Dorr invites us to consider probabilities conditional
on some zero-probability propositions, such as P , F , and P ∨ F . It is, of course,
possible to extend our probability assignments to include probabilities conditional on
propositions such as these, and this can be done in a variety of ways.
to zero.
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Here’s one way to do it. For any n, let Kn = [−n, n], and, for any A ∈ C, let An
be the proposition that commits only to what A says about coin flips in Kn, and says
nothing about what happens outside this interval. That is, take
An =
⋃
u∈A
CKn(u). (7)
Our set B of conditions will consist of all B ∈ C for which there exists N such
Pr(Bn) > 0 for all n > N . For B ∈ B, let AB be the set of A ∈ C such that the
sequence Pr(An|Bn) converges to a limit as n→∞, and, for A ∈ AB, take
Pr(A|B) = lim
n→∞Pr(An|Bn). (8)
A few of the conditional probabilities that we thereby obtain are,
Pr(H|F ) = Pr(T |F ) = Pr(H|P ) = Pr(T |P ) = 1/2;
Pr(P |P ∨ F ) = Pr(F |P ∨ F ) = 1/2;
Pr(P |P ∨HF ) = Pr(F |HP ∨ F ) = 2/3;
Pr(HF |P ∨HF ) = Pr(HP |HP ∨ F ) = 1/3;
Pr(P ∨HF |P ∨ F ) = Pr(HP ∨ F |P ∨ F ) = 3/4.
(9)
The limiting procedure we have sketched is, of course, only one possible limiting proce-
dure, and no claim is made for priority of this over other procedures. We have made a
frankly arbitrary choice, and have obtained the above conditional probabilities; other
choices will yield other values.
The conditional probabilities we have obtained preserve independence and bit-flip
symmetry. The limiting procedure we have chosen manifestly breaks shift symme-
try. Unsurprisingly, the conditional probabilities we obtain from it also violate shift
symmetry. To see this, consider the one-day shift S1. We have,
S1(P ) = HP S1(HF ) = F (10)
However,
Pr(P |P ∨HF ) 6= Pr(HP |HP ∨ F ) (11)
We therefore have extended our probability function in a way that respects indepen-
dence of distinct flips, and also bit-flip symmetry, but violates shift symmetry. We
should ask whether we can do better, and extend our probability function in such a
way that all of the above conditional probabilities are defined so as to respect all of
these symmetries.
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Dorr shows that, counterintuitively,7 the answer is no. Provided that Pr(P |P ∨F )
and Pr(F |P ∨ F ) are defined and are both positive, shift invariance entails that
Pr(H|F ) = Pr(H|P ) = 1. (12)
Proof is given in Appendix 3.
A similar argument yields a violation of countable additivity. Let P+ be the propo-
sition that the coin has landed Heads every day in the past but will land Tails sometime,
either today or in the future, and let F+ be the proposition that the coin will land
Heads every day in the future, but landed Tails today or sometime in the past. Shift
invariance, together with the conditions that Pr(P+|P+ ∨ F+) and Pr(F+|P+ ∨ F+)
are defined and are both nonzero, entails that, for every n, the probability conditional
on P+ that the coin lands Heads today and every day for n days into the future is
one. This in turn entails (letting Hn be the proposition that the coin will land Heads
n days from now and Tn, the proposition that it will land Tails), that, for each n.
Pr(Hn|P+) = 1;
Pr(Tn|P+) = 0; (13)
even though the probability, conditional on P+, that, for some n, Tn is true, is unity.
Including the propositions P , F , and P ∨ F in the set of propositions on which we
can conditionalize, and imposing shift symmetry, is possible, but it comes at a high
cost: we lose independence; it is no longer true that conditionalization on a proposition
that specifies outcomes on a set of days not including today leaves the probability of
the coin landing Heads today unchanged. Symmetry conditions that we would like our
conditional probability space to respect clash; we can’t get all that we want.
Depending on our purpose, we might prefer to preserve one or the other of the
symmetries. If the Eternal Coin is being considered as an idealization of a situation
in which a coin is tossed a large but finite number of times, then shifts will not be
symmetries of the finite system, which is our real object of interest, and so it will not
be important for our purposes to demand shift invariance of the conditional probability
space. There might be other purposes for which shift invariance is of such paramount
importance that it would be worth abandoning independence (though it is hard to see
why it would not be preferable to simply leave those conditional probabilities unde-
fined).
If we think of the setup as involving an actual bi-infinite sequence of coin tosses,
not an idealization of a finite set-up, then, as Dorr convincingly argues, violation of
shift invariance is bizarre. Dorr invites us to imagine ourselves causally isolated from
the Eternal Coin. I learn nothing about the outcomes of its flips as the days pass.
Now, consider the following: HP , the proposition that the coin lands Heads today and
landed Heads every day in the past, is the proposition that, tomorrow, I will express
by the words, “The coin landed Heads every day in the past,” the same sentence that
7Perhaps. The more one thinks about what is required to give values to these conditional probabilities,
the less clear it becomes that we have intuitions about them at all.
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I use today to express the proposition P . Similarly, HP ∨ F is the proposition that I
will express tomorrow using the same words I use today to express P ∨ HF . Today,
when I say “My credence that the coin landed every day in the past, conditional on the
supposition that it either landed Heads every day in the past or will land Heads today
and every day in the future,” I denote Pr(P |P ∨ HF ); tomorrow, the same phrase
denotes Pr(HP |HP ∨ F ). Does it make sense for these to have different values?
To do so involves distinguishing between today and tomorrow in a way that seems
unwarranted by the setup of the problem. Shift invariance, it seems, is a requirement
of rationality.
On the other hand, it is stipulated in the setup that coin tosses on distinct days are
independent of each other. Pr(H|Pn) is equal to 1/2, for every n, no matter how large.
The toss today is independent of every past toss; should it not also be independent of all
the past tosses? Recall that all of these probabilities are meant to be predicated on the
supposition that the setup is as described, which includes stipulation of independent
tosses. For our credences, conditional on this setup, to violate independence, setting
Pr(H|P ) equal to 1, seems no less irrational than violation of shift invariance.
4 Probabilities conditional on a σ-algebra
Consider, once again, Examples 1. As noted, an “obvious” answer to the question of
the probability that a point chosen with uniform probability on the sphere lies in the
Western hemisphere, conditional on the supposition that it lies on the equator, is 1/2.
For the question of the probability that the point lies closer to an equator than a pole,
conditional on the supposition that it lies on the Greenwich meridian, both 1/2 and
1/
√
2 seem to have merit.
One way to think about question 1(a) is to imagine that, first, a circle of latitude
is chosen, and then a point is chosen on that circle according a probability distribution
conditional on the point lying on the circle. Because the area between two circles of
latitude, at angles a, b, measured from the equator, is equal to
1
2
∫ b
a
cosφ dφ,
the latitude Φ must be distributed according to
Pr(Φ ∈ A) = 1
2
∫
A
cosφ dφ. (14)
That is, Φ has density function
fΦ(φ) =
1
2
cosφ. (15)
The longitude Θ is distributed with uniform probability on [−pi, pi], and so has density
function
fΘ(θ) =
1
2pi
. (16)
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Latitude and longitude are independent random variables. That is,
Pr(Φ ∈ A& Θ ∈ B)) = Pr(Φ ∈ A) Pr(Θ ∈ B) =
∫
A
fΦ(φ) dφ
∫
B
fΘ(θ) dθ. (17)
for all measurable A ⊆ [−pi/2, pi/2] and B ⊆ [−pi, pi].
What should the conditional distribution of the longitude Θ be taken to be, con-
ditional on a given circle of latitude? We want the conditional probabilities to mesh
properly with the unconditional probabilities. That is, we want to have
Pr(Φ ∈ A& Θ ∈ B)) =
∫
A
Pr(Θ ∈ B|Φ ∈ φ) fΦ(φ) dφ (18)
for all measurable A,B. The simplest way to do this, which is also the way that is
naturally suggested by the independence of Θ and Φ, is to take Pr(Θ ∈ B|Φ = φ),
for each B, to have the constant value Pr(Θ ∈ B), independent of φ. But it’s not the
only way. We can take any set of latitudes of measure zero, and choose distributions
for Θ, conditional on Φ = φ in that set, any way we want, and still satisfy the meshing
condition (18). That means that (18) is compatible with any answer to question 1(a).
It is natural, however, to take Pr(Θ ∈ B|Φ = φ) to be, for each B, a continuous
function of φ. This condition, together with the meshing condition (18), uniquely fixes
Pr(Θ ∈ B |Φ = φ) = Pr(Θ ∈ B). (19)
Similarly, we can define conditional distributions of latitude, conditional on meridian
lines (lines of constant longitude), and demand that these also mesh with the uncon-
ditional probabilities:
Pr(Φ ∈ A& Θ ∈ B) =
∫
B
Pr(Φ ∈ A|Θ = θ) fΘ(θ) dθ (20)
This, together with the requirement that for each A, Pr(Φ ∈ A|Θ = θ) be a continuous
function of θ, uniquely fixes
Pr(Φ ∈ A|Θ = θ) = Pr(Φ ∈ A), (21)
corresponding to conditional density functions
fΦ(φ |Θ = θ) = 1
2
cosφ. (22)
Consider, now, question 1(b). We can imagine that a meridian is first chosen, and
then a point chosen on that meridian. Using (21) yields the result that, conditional on
any meridian, the probability is 1/
√
2 that the chosen point is closer to the equator
than to a pole.
On the other hand, since we are only imagining these things, we can also imagine the
sphere partitioned by circles parallel to the circle containing the Greenwich meridian
(see Figure 1) and imagine that first one of these circles is chosen, and then a point
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Figure 1: Two coordinatizations of the sphere.
chosen on that circle according to a probability distribution conditional on the circle.
If this procedure is to yield uniform probabilities on the sphere, we must have the
distributions on almost all of these circles be uniform, and this plus continuity militates
a uniform distribution on all of them. This yields the answer 1/2 to question 1(b).
Which answer is correct? If the point on the sphere is, in fact, chosen according to
one of the two-step procedures we have imagined, then such a set-up privileges one of
the answers. But if the point is simply chosen, with uniform probability, on the sphere,
then the set-up privileges neither answer, and, if one or the other has greater intuitive
appeal, this may be because one is implicitly assuming one or the other scenario.
A circle is just a circle,8 and the great circle containing the Greenwich meridian,
qua circle on the sphere, is a element of many different partitions of the sphere. If
we really think that fΦ(φ |Θ = 0), as given by (22), is a conditional density function
yielding the distribution of the random variable Φ conditional on the supposition that
Θ = 0, then it shouldn’t matter how this supposition is described. The supposition
can equally well be described using coordinates that take circles parallel to the great
8Oddly enough, this has been disputed. In connection with this example, E.T. Jaynes (2003, p. 470)
writes,
Nearly everybody feels that he knows perfectly well what a great circle is; so it is difficult to get
people to see that the term ‘great circle’ is ambiguous until we specify what limiting operation
is to produce it.
This strikes me as confused. One and the same great circle can be the limit of many different decreasing
sequences of subsets of the sphere, but the circle is not itself produced by the limiting operation. Not so
with probabilities conditional on a great circle, which, unless stipulated as primitive, are obtained via some
limiting operation.
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circle containing the Greenwich meridian as lines of latitude φ′. Then the great circle
containing our original Greenwich meridian is the set of points for which φ′ = 0. On
this circle the new longitude θ′ differs from the old latitude φ by a constant, and, if we
choose the zero-point of our new longitude as our old equator, we will have θ′ equal to
φ′ on the circle. But a uniform distribution of the new longitude on circles of constant
φ′ requires a conditional density function
fΘ′(θ
′ |Φ′ = φ′) = 1
2pi
(23)
It can’t be the case that, conditional on the chosen point lying on the circle that is the
great circle containing the Greenwich meridian of our first coordinatization and is the
equator of our second, we have different conditional distributions depending on how
we describe the circle. Taking (22) to yield the conditional distribution of Φ on this
circle is incompatible with a uniform distribution of Θ′, as given by (23).
The conclusion we should come to is that, though functions such as Pr(Φ ∈ A |Θ =
θ) and Pr(Θ′ ∈ B |Φ′ = φ′) are useful as calculational tools, it is simply a mistake to
regard them as yielding conditional probabilities, conditional on point values of Θ and
Φ′, unless something in the set-up of the problem picks out one partition as privileged.
Quantities such as Pr(Φ ∈ A |Θ = θ), viewed as a function of θ, are instances
of what is known as conditional probabilities with respect to a random variable. Let
〈Ω,A, P r〉 be a probability space, and let X be a random variable, with distribution
µX , and let σ(X) be the σ-algebra generated by X. Let fA : Ω → R be some σ(X)-
measurable function.9 (Note that this has the consequence that fA is constant on sets
of constant X). We will say that fA is a conditional probability of A with respect to
X iff, for all Borel sets ∆,
Pr(A&X ∈ ∆) =
∫
X∈∆
fA(x) dµX(x), (24)
and write fA = P (A||X). These functions will be unique up to sets of probability zero;
any two such functions are equal almost everywhere.
Conditional probabilities with respect to a random variable are special cases of
conditional probabilities with respect to a σ-algebra. Let 〈Ω,A, P 〉 be a probability
space. For any σ-algebra G ⊆ A, and any A ∈ A, a function fA : Ω→ R is a conditional
probability of A with respect to G iff it is a G-measurable function such that
P (AG) =
∫
G
fA dP (25)
for all G ∈ G. We will write fA = P (A||G). (25) then becomes
P (AG) =
∫
G
P (A||G) dP. (26)
9This means: for any measurable subset ∆ of R, the set f−1A (∆) = {ω | fA(ω) ∈ ∆} is in σ(X).
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Ha´jek (2003, 291) calls this “Kolmogorov’s elaboration of the ratio formula.” The
existence of such functions is guaranteed by the Radon-Nikodym theorem (see, e.g.,
Billingsley (2012, §32–33).)
Conditional probabilities, as usually conceived, are a special case of conditional
probabilities with respect to a σ-algebra. Let {Gi} be a countable partition, and let G
be the σ-algebra generated by this partition. Since the elements of the partition {Gi}
are atoms of this σ-algebra, and P (A||G) is required to be a G-measurable function, it
must be a constant function on each Gi. Let P (A|Gi) be the value that P (A||G)(ω)
takes on for ω ∈ Gi. Then the condition that (26) hold for all G ∈ G is equivalent to
the condition that
P (AGi) = P (A|Gi)P (Gi), (27)
which, of course, yields the familiar ratio formula for P (A|Gi) whenever P (Gi) > 0. In
this sense, we have a generalization of conditional probabilities.
When an agent learns which element of {Gi} is true, she at the same time learns
the truth value of each proposition in the σ-algebra G. The heuristic idea behind the
introduction of probabilities conditional on more general σ-algebras is to mimic this.
A random variable X partitions the space Ω of events into sets of constant X. To learn
the value of X is to learn which of these sets ω is in, and thereby learn, for every set
∆ ∈ σ(X), whether or not ω ∈ ∆.
Let G ⊆ A be a σ-algebra that contains atoms—that is, elements of G with no
non-empty proper subsets in G—that cover Ω. For A ∈ A, let P (A||G) be a conditional
probability of A with respect to G. If G is an atom of G, then P (A||G) must take on a
constant value on G. Should we regard this value, the value of P (A||G) for ω ∈ G, as
the probability of A conditional on the proposition G?
There are two sorts of problems with this. The first is technical and local, in that it
applies only to certain σ-algebras that we might dismiss as pathological. Nonetheless, it
should give us pause, as it shows that the heuristic motivation of the characterization of
P (A||G), namely, as conditional probabilities resulting from an experiment in which it
is learned, for each element G of a σ-algebra G, whether or not ω ∈ G, can break down.
The second sort of problem is conceptual and global, and poses a serious objection
to taking the value of P (A||G) for ω ∈ G, as the probability of A conditional on the
proposition G (except in special circumstances, to be discussed in the next section).
The first problem is this. On the heuristic view that P (A||G), evaluated on some
atom G of G, yields the probability of A appropriate to learning that ω ∈ G, we would
expect that, if G is a σ-algebra whose atoms are all the singleton sets, then P (A||G)
would be equal to 1 if ω is in A and 0 if not, since learning which atom of G obtains is
complete information about ω. But this won’t always be the case. Let our probability
space be the unit interval with Lebesgue measure. Let G consist of the the smallest
σ-algebra containing all of the singleton sets; this consists of the countable sets and
their complements. Now let A be any set with P (A) ∈ (0, 1). It is easy to see that
P (A||G)(ω) must be equal to P (A) for almost all ω, violating our expectation that it
will everywhere be equal to 0 or 1.10
10This is example 33.11 of Billingsley (2012).
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The second problem is the one we have already seen in connection with the Borel-
Kolmogorov paradox, and it is more serious. Let G be an atom of a σ-algebra G.
Though, for any G with P (G) = 0, the condition (26) leaves the value of P (A||G) on G
undetermined, the condition together with other natural constraints, such as requiring
P (A||G) to be a continuous function, can, as we have seen, determine the value of
P (A||G) on G. But this is not enough to warrant taking this value as the probability
of A, conditional on G, as the same set G will be an atom of other σ-algebras, and
the same considerations might dictate that, for some other σ-algebra G′ containing G,
the value that P (A||G′) has on G be different from the value that P (A||G) on G. In
cases, such as the sphere example, in which the set-up privileges neither σ-algebra, it
would be a mistake to take either of these values (or any other) as the probability of
A conditional on G.
This is, of course, pretty much the standard view. Kolmogorov, in his discussion of
the Borel paradox, writes, “This shows that the concept of a probability conditional on
an isolated given hypothesis whose probability equals 0 is inadmissible” (Kolmogorov,
1950, p. 51). Taking up this suggestion, Easwaran concludes,
this means we must view conditional probability as (in general) a three-place
function, depending not only on A and G, but also the partition G defining
the set of “relevant alternatives” to G. In particular cases, this partition
will be specified by the experiment an agent is considering G as an outcome
to, or the set of alternative hypotheses under consideration, or some other
contextual factor. Thus, we must think of conditional degree of belief as a
function P (A|G,G) rather than just P (A|G) (Easwaran, 2011, pp. 143–44).
We should ask: under what conditions will there be a set of relevant alternatives that
is uniquely picked out by the set-up?
It is frequently suggested, as in the quotation from Easwaran, that it is the experi-
ment that yields the data that determines a relevant partition (see also the discussion
in Re´nyi 2007a, §2.1). On this rationale, though, it is hard to see that we would ever
need to go beyond a finite partition. Unless we are entertaining the fiction of agents
with infinite powers of discrimination, there are only finitely many distinguishable al-
ternatives as to the outcome of any experiment. (This is even easier to see in these
days in which laboratory equipment has digital readout than it was in the old days of
pointers and dials!) Even if we do imagine agents with infinite powers of discrimina-
tion, the set of alternatives they could record, using a finite alphabet, in a lab notebook
of finite capacity, is a finite set.
Unproblematic null-condition conditional probabilities are not as commonplace as
some of the literature might suggest. However, there are cases in which the set-up of a
problem does permit one to speak unambiguously of the the probability of an event con-
ditional on a null proposition. In those cases, null-condition conditional probabilities
are unobjectionable, and they can be useful, though they are not indispensable.
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5 Unproblematic Null-Condition Probabilities
5.1 Likelihood functions
It is common, in statistical practice, to regard outcomes of some experiment as be-
ing generated by an incompletely known probability distribution characteristic of the
experimental set-up; data gathered is used to gain information about that distribu-
tion. We commonly consider a family of candidate distributions; typically this family
is indexed by some set of parameters. For instance, we might regard an experimentally
measurable variable as being normally distributed with unknown mean µ and unknown
variance σ2. A data-set is generated, and is used to gain information about the values
of the parameters.
Let Ω be the set of possible outcomes of an experiment, let F be the set of mea-
surable subsets of Ω, and, for every value of θ in some parameter-space Γ, let Pθ be
a probability distribution on 〈Ω,F〉. For fixed E ∈ F , the function LE(θ) = Pθ(E),
considered as a function of θ, is called a likelihood function.
In standard, frequentist statistics, the parameter space is not itself subject to prob-
abilistic considerations; it is regarded as nonsensical to ascribe probabilities, prior or
posterior, to propositions regarding values of the parameters. Hence, Pθ is not regarded
as a conditional probability distribution, conditional on a proposition of probability 0.
On a Bayesian approach, on the other hand, one also ascribes probabilities to propo-
sitions regarding the values of the parameters, and the process of gaining information
about the parameter values is modelled by conditionalization on the experimental re-
sult. Let G be a σ-algebra of subsets of Γ. Let H be the smallest σ-algebra containing
F ×G. Suppose that, for each E ∈ F , the likelihood function LE(θ) is a G-measurable
function. Then, given a probability measure Q on 〈Γ,G〉, we can form a new prob-
ability space whose event space is the Cartesian product Ω × Γ of the experimental
outcome space and the parameter space, and whose measurable sets are the set H: we
define a probability measure Pr as the unique countably additive extension to H of
the function that, on F × G, is given by
Pr(F ×G) =
∫
G
LF (θ) dQ. (28)
We now have a probability space 〈Ω × Γ,H, P r〉. The experimental outcome X,
and parameter value Θ, are random variables on this probability space. The σ-algebra
σ(X) that consists of propositions about the experimental outcome is F×Γ, and σ(Θ),
the σ-algebra that consists of propositions about parameter values, is Ω× G. One can
readily verify that a version of conditional probability with respect to σ(Θ) is obtained
by setting
P (E||Θ)(ω) = LE(Θ(ω)). (29)
Any version of conditional probability with respect to σ(Θ) will have to agree with
(29) with probability one.
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Is it permissible to regard the values that P (E||Θ) takes on on the atoms of σ(Θ)
as probabilities conditional on null propositions? There is a natural one-one corre-
spondence between the atoms of σ(Θ) and the points in the parameter space Γ. In
this case, we have a σ-algebra that is picked out as special by the set-up of the prob-
lem; the random variable Θ represents the parameters of the system about which we
are trying to gain information, and the atoms of the σ-algebra σ(Θ) correspond to
maximal specification of these parameters. In this case, there seems no threat of am-
biguity due to variant choices of σ-algebra to conditionalize on, and we can, relatively
unproblematically, regard these values as null-condition probabilities.
We can form a conditional probability space by taking the set B of permissible
conditions to include, in addition to all propositions with positive probability, also the
atoms of σ(Θ), corresponding to point values of our parameters. This still leaves us
with a set of conditions that, though it goes beyond the standard set, is still fairly
sparse compared to the full set H of measurable sets.
It is not uncommon to deal with nested families of models, in which the parameter
space of one model is a lower-dimensional subspace of the parameter space of another.
This might come about, for example, by considering a model in which the value of
some parameter is fixed, or two parameters are constrained to be equal. We will want
to retain the same likelihoods in the reduced model. We will also want a probability
distribution over the the reduced space. Here again the issue illustrated by the Borel-
Kolmogorov paradox resurfaces; the probability distribution on the higher-dimensional
space does not determine a distribution on the lower-dimensional space, and defining
one via a limiting procedure will lead to differing results, depending on the procedure
chosen. It is a mistake to regard the lower-dimensional model as being obtained, in a
straightforward way, from the higher-dimensional model via conditionalization.
Though, in this case, it is permissible to treat the likelihoods as probabilities con-
ditional on point-values of the parameters, it is by no means necessary to do so. All of
our standard statistical reasoning goes through if we restrict our domain of condition-
alization to the traditional choice of sets with positive probability.
If we obtain evidence E about the experimental outcome, then we can update our
credences about parameter values via conditionalization. For any measurable subset
∆ of parameter-space,
Pr(Θ ∈ ∆)→ PrE(θ ∈ ∆) = Pr(E & Θ ∈ ∆)
Pr(E)
. (30)
If the prior distribution of Θ is given by a density function µ, then the process of
conditionalization yields a new density function µE . In order for (30) to be satisfied,
we must have, for almost all θ,
µE(θ) =
LE(θ)µ(θ)
Pr(E)
. (31)
This is often called the continuous form of Bayes’ theorem. Thinking of (31) as a form
of Bayes’ theorem invites to think of LE(θ) as the probability of E conditional on a
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point value of the parameter θ. But the use of the new density µE is to generate new
probabilities PrE(Θ ∈ ∆), and this can be done via (30), and there is no need to invoke
probabilities conditional on null subsets of the parameter space.
All that we need for Bayesian statistical inference is the probability space 〈Ω,H, P r〉,
and operations on this, including conditionalization on new evidence, can go through
in the standard way, without invoking any conditional probabilities conditional on null
subsets of the parameter space. We can, if convenient, work with the likelihood func-
tions LE(θ), whose existence is guaranteed by the Radon-Nikodym theorem. But there
is no need to regard these as bona fide conditional probabilities, and their usefulness
as calculational tools does not depend on any such interpretation.
5.2 Stochastic processes
In the theory of stochastic processes, we deal with a set {Xt | t ∈ T} of random variables,
where the index t is to be thought of as a time index (which may be continuous or
discrete). As an example, consider the following simple two-step process, adapted
from Bayes (1763). A ball is thrown onto a square table ABCD, with unit sides,
with uniform probability on the square for its landing place. A line drawn through
its landing point, parallel to AD. We then throw a second ball, again with uniform
probability, and are provided with a report of whether the second ball landed to the
left or the right of the line we drew. In this case, it is unproblematic to say that,
conditional on the first ball’s landing at a distance x from the left side of the table, the
chance of the second ball landing to the left of the line is x.
But we don’t have to; everything we need to say about the process can be said
without invocation of null-condition conditional probabilities. Let X1 be the random
variable that represents the distance of the landing place of the first ball from the left
side of the table, and let X2 be the random variable that takes on the value L or R
depending on whether the second ball lands to the left or right of the line through the
landing-place of the first ball. We can specify the two-step process by saying that X1
is uniformly distributed on (0, 1), and that conditional probabilities for X2 are given
by
Pr(X2 = L |X1 = x) = x
Pr(X2 = R |X1 = x) = 1− x. (32)
but we can also achieve the same effect by saying that joint probabilities regarding X1
and X2 satisfy
Pr(X2 = L&X1 ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
x dx
Pr(X2 = R&X1 ∈ ∆) =
∫
∆
(1− x) dx (33)
for every Borel set ∆ ⊆ (0, 1). Null-condition conditional probabilities, though they
may provide a useful way of talking, are not needed to specify the stochastic process.
More generally, given a stochastic process involving random variables {Xt | t ∈ T},
for any time t0 we can consider the set of random variables with t ≤ t0, and form a
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σ-algebra T0 generated by this set of random variables. For any proposition of the form
Xr ∈ ∆, we will have conditional probabilities with respect to T0, P (Xr ∈ ∆||T0). The
values these take on the atoms of T0 may be regarded as probabilities conditional on a
full specification of events up to t0, even if these atoms have zero probability.
Cautions that by now are familiar are in place: though the set-up gives us a privi-
leged σ-algebra, namely, the σ-algebra corresponding to a full specification of events up
to t0, including these events in our set of admissible conditions for conditional proba-
bility still leaves us with a rather spare set of conditions, and problems and ambiguities
may arise if we seek to include in our set of conditions null propositions with less than
complete information about the past. Secondly, the stochastic process only specifies
these conditional probabilities for almost all histories; different versions of the condi-
tional probabilities may differ on probabilities conditional on past histories in some set
of measure zero. These are not taken as corresponding distinct stochastic processes,
as they yield the same probability for any set of events.
The Eternal Coin example of §3.3 illustrates this latter point. Let P be the σ-
algebra consisting of propositions about results of coin tosses to the past of today. The
atoms of this σ-algebra comprise all possible complete specifications of the past; the
proposition P , that the coin landed heads every day in the past, is one such. The
proposition H, that the coin lands heads today, is independent of the σ-algebra P.
That is,
Pr(AH) = Pr(A) Pr(H) (34)
for all A ∈ P. This entails that we must have
P (H||P)(u) = Pr(H) = 1/2 (35)
for almost all u in our event space. But this doesn’t preclude Dorr, or anyone else so
inclined, from assigning the value 1, or any other value, to the probability of H condi-
tional on the proposition P , or on any set of propositions comprising a set of measure
zero. Distinct choices of this sort yield the same probabilities for all propositions.
If it is a physical process that we are modelling, this, arguably, is all that mat-
ters. Suppose that we are formulating a physical theory with stochastic dynamics, and
formulate the theory in terms of transition probabilities, that is, probabilities about
future events conditional on past events. Two formulations that agree on transition
probabilities for all but a set of histories of measure zero attribute the same proba-
bilities to all sets of events. On any reasonable criterion of individuation of physical
theories, these should count as variant formulations of the same theory. This means
that, if we want to think of the laws of a stochastic physical theory as specifying, for
every complete history up to time t, conditional probabilities concerning events to the
future of t, what the laws actually specify is an equivalence class of such conditional
probabilities, where two sets of transition probabilities are equivalent if they agree on
almost all histories.
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5.3 The Principal Principle
The Principal Principle, so named by Lewis (1980), is the prescription that your cre-
dence at time t in a proposition A, conditional on the supposition that the chance at
t of A is x and any admissible proposition, be x. That is,
Crt(A | cht(A) = x& E) = x. (36)
for any admissible E, where “[a]dmissible propositions are the sort of information
whose impact on credence about outcomes comes entirely by way of credence about
the chances of those outcomes” (Lewis, 1980, p. 272). This is to be true for every
value of x in [0, 1]. Any credences about the chance of A will assign zero credence to
uncountably many singleton sets. Thus, it looks as if the Principal Principle commits
us to conditionalizing on null propositions.
This, again, is unobjectionable, as we have a distinguished σ-algebra, consisting
of propositions of the form cht(A) ∈ ∆, where ∆ ranges over Borel subsets of [0, 1].
But use of the Principal Principle itself does not by itself commit us to null-condition
probabilities. The essential content of the Principle can be expressed as the prescription
that, for every interval ∆ ⊆ [0, 1] with Crt(cht(A) ∈ ∆) > 0, and any admissible E,
Crt(A | E & cht(A) ∈ ∆) ∈ ∆. (37)
Thus, even without primitive probabilities conditional on null propositions, we get
what we need.
This readily extends to credences about multiple propositions. For any finite set
A = {A1, ..., An} of propositions, we require that, for all measurable ∆ ⊆ [0, 1]n, with
Crt(cht(A ∈ ∆)) > 0,
Crt(∩iAi | E & cht(A) ∈ ∆) ∈ Conv(∆), (38)
where Conv(∆) is the convex hull of ∆.
6 Conclusion
Talk of probabilities conditional on zero-probability propositions is common in the
philosophical literature. There is nothing necessarily incoherent in such talk, and we
may, for certain purposes, find it convenient to include such propositions in the stock
of proposition on which we conditionalize. But the motivations for doing so have been
exaggerated.
Moreover, though symmetry considerations may guide us in choice of probabil-
ity distribution conditional on null propositions, such considerations can be less than
reliable guides. Imposing the requirement that the conditional probability space be
invariant under all symmetries of the unconditional probability space is excessively
restrictive. If we want to extend our conditional probability space to include condi-
tionalization on null propositions, we will have to be selective about which symmetries
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of the unconditional probability space we impose on the conditional probability space.
In some cases—such as the sphere—there may be a natural choice of which symme-
tries to impose. In other cases, of which Dorr’s Eternal Coin is a striking example,
symmetry considerations will lead us in opposing directions, without a clear choice to
be made.
If, nonetheless, you want to include null proposition in your set of conditions:
proceed with caution, and with care to state explicitly how your conditional probability
space is to be constructed.
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Appendix 1 Terminology
1.1 Probability Spaces
For any set S, an algebra of subsets of S is a set of subsets of S that contains S and
is closed under complementation and unions. A σ-algebra of subsets of S is an algebra
that is closed under countable unions. For the real line R, we define the Borel sets as
the smallest σ-algebra containing all open intervals.
If A is an algebra of subsets of S, a function P : A → R is additive iff, for any
disjoint A,B ∈ A,
P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B).
If A is a σ-algebra of subsets of S, a function P : A → R is countably additive iff,
for any sequence {Ai} of disjoint sets in A,
P (
∞⋃
i=1
Ai) =
∞∑
i=1
P (Ai).
A probability space is a triple 〈S,A, P r〉, where S is a set, to be thought of as the
set of elementary events, A is an algebra of subsets of S, which are the sets of events
(propositions) to which probabilities will be ascribed, and Pr : A → R is a probability
function, that is, a positive, additive set function with Pr(S) = 1. Since we will have
reasons to consider probability functions that are not countably additive, we depart
from tradition in not assuming countable additivity unless explicitly stated. If we
require countable additivity, then A is required to be a σ-algebra, and we will refer to
Pr as a probability measure.
If 〈S,A, P r〉 is a probability space, a random variable is a measurable function
X : S → R, that is, a function such that, for any Borel set B, the set
X−1(B) = {ω ∈ S |X(ω) ∈ B}
is in A. A random variable X generates a subalgebra of A, called σ(X), which is the
set of all X−1(B), as B ranges over Borel subsets of the real line.
1.2 Conditional Probability Spaces
Following Re´nyi (1955, 2007a,b),11 we define a conditional probability space as a quadru-
plet 〈S,A,B, P 〉, where S is a set of events, A an algebra of subsets of S, B a subset
of A, to be thought of as the set of events on which we may conditionalize, and P is
11Though inspired and instructed by Re´nyi’s treatment, this definition departs from Re´nyi in two ways.
First, Re´nyi requires PB(A) to be defined for every A ∈ A. This may be undesirable; see Appendix 2.
Second, Re´nyi requires countable additivity, and we leave open the possibility of conditional probability
functions that are merely finitely additive. Re´nyi (2007a, §2.2) adds the further conditions that the set B be
closed under finite disjunctions, and that it contain a sequence {Bn} that covers Ω. A subset of a σ-algebra
A satisfying these two conditions, and not containing the null set, Re´nyi calls a bunch of sets.
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a function that takes B ∈ B to a function PB : AB → R, where, for each B, AB is a
subalgebra of A, and
i). For each B ∈ B
(a) PB(A) ≥ 0 for all A ∈ AB.
(b) For all A ∈ A, if B ⊆ A, then A ∈ AB and PB(A) = 1.
(c) For disjoint A,A′ ∈ AB, PB(A ∨A′) = PB(A) + PB(A′).
ii). For all B,C ∈ B and A,B ∈ AC , if BC ∈ B then
PC(AB) = PBC(A) PC(B),
provided that C ∈ AB and A ∈ ABC .
A conditional probability space can be thought of as a family of probability spaces
{〈S,AB, PB〉 | B ∈ B}, required to mesh with each other via (ii).
It is an immediate consequence of (ii) that, for any C ∈ B and B ⊆ C, if B ∈ AC
and PC(B) > 0, then, for all A ∈ AC ,
PB(A) =
PC(AB)
PC(B)
(39)
provided that B ∈ B and A ∈ AB. This allows us to define probabilities conditional
on B, provided they don’t clash with those yielded by some other D ∈ B such that
B ⊆ D, B ∈ AD, and PD(B) > 0. For this reason, we will usually assume the further
condition,
iii). For all C ∈ B and B ⊆ C, if B ∈ AC and PC(B) > 0, then B ∈ B and AC ⊆ AB.
Given a probability space 〈S,A, P r〉, let A∗ be the subset of A consisting of sets B
with Pr(B) > 0. Let P ∗ be the function that maps B ∈ A∗ to the probability function
PB : A → [0, 1], given by
PB(A) =
Pr(AB)
Pr(B)
. (40)
Then 〈S,A,A∗, P ∗〉 is a conditional probability space, corresponding to the standard
choice of having conditional probability defined only when the condition has nonzero
probability.
We will say that a probability space 〈S,A, P r〉 is invariant under a bijection T :
S → S if and only if T(A) = A and, for all A ∈ A, Pr(T(A)) = Pr(A). Similarly, a
conditional probability space 〈S,A,B, P 〉 is invariant under T if and only if T(A) = A,
T(B) = B, and, for all B ∈ B, AT(B) = T(AB) and PT(B)(T(A)) = PB(A) for all
A ∈ AB.
Appendix 2 A rotationally invariant conditional
probability space
Let S be the set of points on the unit sphere, let λS be uniform measure on the unit
sphere, and let LS be the set of all λS-measurable subsets of S. Let C be the set of all
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circles on S. For each circle C ∈ C, let λC be uniform measure on the circle C, and let
LC be the set of λC-measurable subsets of C.
We can construct standard conditional probability spaces 〈S,LS ,L∗S , P ∗S〉 and 〈C,LC ,L∗C , P ∗C〉,
which include conditionalization only on sets of nonzero measure. We want to extend
〈S,LS ,L∗S , P ∗S〉 to include, at minimum, conditionalization on circles, in such a way
that probabilities conditional on these circles yield uniform probabilities on the circles.
Let us take B to be
B = L∗S ∪
⋃
C∈C
L∗C . (41)
Note that each element of B is either in L∗S or is a subset of a unique circle C. Take
AB to be LS for B ∈ L∗S . For B ∈ L∗C , take A ∈ AB iff A′ ⊂ A for some A′ ∈ LC .
Define
PB(A) =

λS(AB)
λS(B)
, B ∈ L∗S ;
λC(AB)
λC(B)
, B ∈ L∗C .
(42)
We have constructed a conditional probability space that is invariant under all rigid
rotations, and includes conditionalization on circles and some subsets of circles.
For any A ∈ LS with λS(A) = 0, every subset of A is a measurable set, and is
assigned measure 0. Since each circle C has λS(C) = 0, this means that every subset
of C is in LS . Since not every subset of C is in LC , PC(A) is not defined for arbitrary
A ∈ LS . We might want to extend PC so that it is defined on all A ∈ LS . But, as
already mentioned, we can do so, and preserve rotational invariance, only at the price
of sacrificing countable additivity. We can’t get all that we want.
Appendix 3 The Eternal Coin: Proof of Dorr’s
theorem
We will speak in general terms but readers should think of the example at hand, that
of the Eternal Coin. We assume Axiom (iii) of Appendix 1.2.
Suppose there is a proposition P , and a transformation T, such that T(P ) |= P . If
Pr(P ) > 0, then
Pr(T(P ) | P ) = Pr(T(P ))
Pr(P )
, (43)
and so T-invariance would entail that Pr(T(P ) | P ) = 1. Furthermore, if there exists
a proposition Z such that T(Z) = Z, P |= Z, and Pr(P |Z) > 0, then
Pr(T(P ) |P ) = Pr(T(P ) |Z)
Pr(P |Z) , (44)
and so, once again, T-invariance would entail that Pr(T(P ) |P ) = 1.
ButT-invariant propositions of the right sort may be hard to come by, and there
may be no such Z. Suppose, however, that there exist propositions X, Z, such that
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P |= X |= Z, and T(P ) |= T(X) |= Z. Then, if P , T(P ), X, and T(X) are all in AZ ,
and Pr(P |Z) > 0, and if Pr(T(P ) |T(X)) is defined, we have
Pr(P |Z) = Pr(P |X) Pr(X |Z);
Pr(T(P ) |Z) = Pr(T(P ) |T(X)) Pr(T(X) |Z),
(45)
and so,
Pr(T(P ) |P ) = Pr(T(P ) |T(X))
Pr(P |X)
Pr(T(X) |Z)
Pr(X |Z) . (46)
Now suppose that there is also a proposition F such that T−1(F ) |= F , with Pr(F |Z) >
0. Suppose, also, that T−1(F ) |= X and F |= T(X). Then
Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = Pr(T
−1(F ) |X)
Pr(F |T(X))
Pr(X |Z)
Pr(T(X) |Z) . (47)
Multiplying (46) and (47) gives us,
Pr(T(P ) |P ) Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = Pr(T(P ) |T(X))
Pr(P |X)
Pr(T−1(F ) |X)
Pr(F |T(X) . (48)
So far, we haven’t invoked any symmetry assumptions. If we impose T-invariance, we
have
Pr(T(P ) |T(X)) = Pr(P |X);
Pr(T−1(F ) |X) = Pr(F |T(X)), (49)
and (48) becomes
Pr(T(P ) |P ) Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = 1, (50)
from which it follows that
Pr(T(P ) |P ) = Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = 1. (51)
Now, since we have assumed that T(P ) |= P and T−1(F ) |= F , there always do
exists Z,X satisfying the conditions stipulated. Take Z to be P ∨ F , and take X to
be P ∨ T−1(F ). Then T(X) is T(P ) ∨ F .
To sum up: we have established
Proposition 1 Let 〈Ω,A,B, P 〉 be a conditional probability space satisfying condition
(iii). Suppose there exist a transformation T of Ω and propositions P, F , such that
Z = P ∨ F ∈ B and P, F ∈ AZ , such that
i). (a) T(P ) |= P ;
(b) T−1(F ) |= F ;
ii). (a) Pr(P |Z) > 0;
(b) Pr(F |Z) > 0.
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Then
Pr(T(P ) |P ) Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = Pr(T(P ) |T(X))
Pr(P |X)
Pr(T−1(F ) |X)
Pr(F |T(X)) ,
where X = P ∨ T−1(F ).
If, further,
iii). (a) Pr(T(P ) |T(X)) = Pr(P |X);
(b) Pr(T−1(F ) |X) = Pr(F |T(X));
then
Pr(T(P ) |P ) = Pr(T−1(F ) |F ) = 1.
Applied to the Eternal Coin, let T be S1, which shifts everything forward one day.
P , as before, is the proposition that the coin handed heads every day in the past, and
F , the proposition that the coin will land heads every day in the future. Let H be the
proposition that the coin lands heads today. Then S1(P ) is HP , and S
−1
1 (F ) is HF .
Clearly, HP |= P and HF |= F . If
Pr(P |P ∨ F ) > 0;
Pr(F |P ∨ F ) > 0; (52)
and if
Pr(HP |HP ∨ F ) = Pr(P |P ∨HF );
Pr(F |HP ∨ F ) = Pr(HF |P ∨HF ), (53)
then
Pr(H|P ) = Pr(H|F ) = 1. (54)
We can run the same argument with Sk, for any positive k, yielding the conclusion
that, for every n ≥ 0, the probability conditional on P that the coin lands heads today
and n days into the future is 1, as is the probability, conditional on F , that the coin
lands heads today and n days into the past.
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